Impact of the shadow banking system on monetary policy in China by Haisen, H & Yazdifar, H
 I 
 
Impact of the Shadow Banking System on Monetary Policy 
in China 
Abstract 
The shadow banking system in China has its own characteristics compared to 
conventional commercial banks and the foreign shadow banking system. Its 
emergence is important to the economic development and financial system in China. 
However, it also challenges the implementation of monetary policy and regulation. 
China is in the economic shunt period and their monetary policy system is somewhat 
lagging behind the advanced economic system. This paper is therefore designed to 
figure out the impacts of the shadow banking system on monetary policy. After 
analysis of SVAR model, OLS regression, trend graph and correlation coefficient, 
results show that an increase in the growth rate of the shadow banking system would 
affect the monetary policy by increasing money supply and the value of CPI. 
Moreover, the implementation of easy or tight monetary policy by increasing or 
decreasing the benchmark interest rate would not be able to achieve the original 
goals due to the activities of the shadow banking system. It is suggested that the 
Chinese authorities should follow the market requirement to improve the monetary 
policy system by means of supervision and regulation on the shadow banking system 
which would the monetary policy effect. 
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1. Introduction 
2008 was a notable year for the world, with a large number of financial 
predators suffering bankruptcy or being taken over due to the financial crisis in 
the USA, such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae, etc. (Griffith, 2012). Moreover, this financial crisis encouraged the world 
to develop a new financial system, named the 'shadow banking system', a 
hidden credit relationship in securitization(Caijing.com.cn, 2012). Growth of 
the shadow banking system is based on development of financial innovations, 
and the core of this system is residential mortgage-backed securities which 
cast the prosperity of the US real estate and banking but which also inflated 
the virtualbubble and caused the systemic risk which ultimately became a 
financial crisis (Turner, 2012). 
 
To address the financial crisis and stimulate the economy, China’s 
government initiated an easy monetary policy and provided a stimulus 
package estimated at RMB4 trillion in 2008 (Chinaview.cn, 2008). However, 
since the reorientation of policies, most of the real estate projects have to deal 
with the issue of capital chain. Small and medium enterprises face increased 
difficulty in raising money from banks because of their high risk and low profit, 
therefore their only choice is to seek finance from private financial institutions, 
including micro-credit, mortgage and leasing companies (Adrian, et.al. 2012). 
Meanwhile, commercial banks try to lend in disguise and avoid the regulation 
supervision by issuing wealth management products(Zhang, 2012). All of 
these activities stimulate the development of the shadow banking system in 
China, and create an added risk, such as escaping loan debt which caused a 
lot of social attention. At this time, consideration of China’s shadow banking 
system was being raised in line with an anticipation of the next subprime 
mortgage crisis. 
 
As the shadow banking system has become the focus of social attention 
in China, there is both a theoretical and practical significance to studying and 
identifying this particular system (Caijing.com.cn, 2012). On one hand, it can 
inspire people to ponder the existing policy by adjusting the orientation of 
theoretical research of China’s monetary policy and by improving it through 
discussion of recent financial developments. On the other hand, exploring 
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more effective means of monetary policy will be helpful to control the excesses 
of the shadow banking system and to resolve the causes of financial instability 
within the system. Meanwhile, a thorough regulation of the shadow banking 
system is necessary in order to promote this financial innovation in an orderly 
manner (Caijing.com.cn, 2012). 
 
The aim of this paper is to identify the role of the shadow banking system 
in China’s monetary and financial system, and to provide some 
recommendations to improve the monetary policy system. 
 
The research questions set for the present study are: 
1. How does the shadow banking system affect monetary policy? 
2. Is it related to economic growth? 
3. What is the relationship between the shadow banking system and 
money supply? 
4. What is the relationship between the shadow banking system and 
deposits? 
 
This paper will apply the structural vector auto regression model to 
analyze the contemporaneous relationship among the related variables which 
can indicate the shadow banking system, monetary policy and economic 
growth. The structural vector auto regression model is able to capture the 
instantaneous constitutive relationship between the variables in the dynamic 
system. It is also generally used to analyze financial indicators such as money 
supply and CPI based on economic theory basis(Gottschalk, 2001). In addition, 
OLS regression, correlation analysis and underlying trend analysis will be 
applied to determine linear relationships between each pair of variables. These 
methods will be used to help provide an explanation for the impacts of the 
shadow banking system. 
 
The data collection might be a limiting and delimiting factor of this paper. 
The variableused to indicate the shadow banking system is selected as total 
loans (balance of loans from financial institutions) which includes loans issued 
by conventional commercial banks, entrusted loans and trust loans which 
belong to the activities of the shadow banking system. Furthermore, the index 
of the size of the shadow banking system in China not only includes entrusted 
loans and trust loans issued by trust companies and commercial banks, but 
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also includes private loans and wealth management products (off-balance 
sheet activities of commercial banks) , etc. It should be noted that it is difficult 
to estimate the exact size of the shadow banking system over a long period of 
time, as impacts on other systems need to be analyzed, and also this data is 
not available from the EIU country database, People's Bank of China (central 
bank) website or the wind information database. Therefore, in order to analyze 
the impacts of the shadow banking system on monetary policy, this paper will 
use total loans to indicate the shadow banking system. It might not be quite as 
accurate but can still provide a rational explanation for the specific situation in 
China which caused the activities of the shadow banking system to some 
extent.  
 
The paper is organized thus: Section 2 is a literature review designed to 
introduce a background to the shadow banking system and the effects of the 
shadow banking system demonstrated by the results of historical articles, 
reports and journals. Section 3 is the methodology applied in this paper, 
including a review of the research method, design appropriateness, and a 
discussion of data collection. Results and discussion are presented in section 
4, which relate to the findings from the accumulated data. Finally, section 5 
covers the conclusion and recommendations which provide a discussion of the 
results and suggestions for the future. 
 
2. Literature Review 
This section is designed to introduce the background of the shadow 
banking system in China from the view of its differences to commercial banks , 
the foreign shadow banking system and provides the rationale as to the 
existence of the shadow banking system. A discussion follows of the main 
impacts of shadow banking system on the monetary policy based on the 
results of previous studies. 
2.1 The shadow banking system in China 
The development of the securitization market in China is lagging behind 
the highly developed derivatives market of the USA and due to its particular 
legal system fails to be in line with the developed countries (Li, 2005). Shadow 
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banking in China has its own characteristics and is becoming a significant 
competitor and partner of commercial banks. According to IMF’s Global 
Financial Stability Report, shadow banking in China is different from other 
countries, not only referring to credit intermediation involving entities or 
activities by non-banks but also acting as financial intermediation outside the 
regulated banking system with the following activities: underground banking, 
trust products, wealth management products (WMPs), and other 
off-balance-sheet loan-like claims held by commercial banks (Caijing.com.cn, 
2012). 
 
The shadow banking system in China copies of the operation model of 
commercial banks, its original fund is collected from bank deposits at low 
interest rates, and benefits from lending at high interest rates which replaces 
the role of commercial banks (Financialpost.com, 2012). According to Wen 
and Chen (2010) and Yi (2009), from the perspective of development, there 
are three main parts to the shadow banking system in China. Primarily, China’s 
commercial bank is trying to develop asset-backed securities with the 
cooperation of non-bank institutions such as trust companies and 
assets-management companies. Meanwhile the large state enterprises, 
investment funds and private funds have participated in the credit market to 
invest and lend. Moreover, some pawn shops, guarantors and micro-credit 
companies also provide credit to the public through their lending activities. 
 
Private finance in china is risky and outside the regulation. It features high 
liquidity, high interest rates and encourages deposits to run out at the bank 
(Cao and Lin, 2005). The shadow banking system grows rapidly in China 
owing to the process of financial disintermediation. Credit growth of the 
in-balance-sheet of commercial banks cannot meet and reflect public demand 
(Li and Wu, 2011). Meanwhile, the shadow banking system continues its 
innovation with the aid of diversification of financial institutions, financial 
products and financial instruments. 
2.2 The Cause of Emergence of Shadow Banking System in 
China 
Basically the shadow banking system is a market-oriented financing 
institution, it evolves as a result of the development of financial innovation and 
provides credit to the public independently of commercial banks. Its 
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emergence is the expression of social and financial development and the 
consequence of the growth of social demand. The shadow banking system in 
China acts as an intermediary to provide funds for the small medium 
enterprises or other entities which cannot obtain finance through traditional 
channels due to an imbalance of liquidity (Adrian, et.al. 2012). 
2.2.1 Financial innovation 
According to Adrian (2012), implementation of financial innovation 
impelsthe shadow banking system to generate apparent economic efficiencies, 
and create new channels of risk transmission between traditional banks and 
capital markets. Zhang (2012) suggested that while financial innovation of 
securitization brings prosperity to the financial market, it also breeds a huge 
shadow banking system outside the conventional commercial banking system.  
2.2.2 Imbalance Liquidity 
The imbalance liquidity in China is an important basis to the development 
of the shadow banking system, mainly reflected in the adjustment of national 
policy and the imbalances within commercial bank loans (Chinaview.cn, 2008). 
As a result from the unexpected adjustment in the national policy, the original 
investment might lose financial support and this would lead to a lack of cash 
flow. On the other hand, commercial banks prefer lending to large-scale 
enterprises which have sufficient sources of funding to be able to control credit 
risk and reduce credit cost. Small to medium enterprises therefore cannot gain 
sufficient loans from commercial banks and consequently rely on the shadow 
banking system. 
 
China’s government initiated an easy monetary policy to deal with the 
financial crisis of 2008, to boost domestic consumption and investment by 
reducing the reserve requirement ratio,  to reduce the deposit and loan 
interest rate and introduce a discounted interest rate (Chinaview.cn, 2008). 
Meanwhile, a stimulus package estimated at RMB4 trillion was spent over the 
next two years to finance programs. In 2009, the government continued to 
implement the moderately easy monetary policy, by increasing the amount of 
money supply and credit supply. According to the report of China’s monetary 
policy implementation in Q4 2009 (sina.com.cn, 2010), the growth of M2 in 
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2009 should be 17% according to the government’s plan, although the residual 
amount of M2 was RMB58.62 billion, a growth of 29.42% year-on-year which 
was much higher than the expectations of the central bank. Under the flood of 
liquidity, circumstances owing to the easy monetary policy, both small medium 
enterprises and realty business were booming. But since the central bank 
implemented the tight monetary policy to restrain inflation and speculative 
behavior in 2010, money supply in the market was suddenly tightened 
preventing many investment projects from being completed. According to the 
Financial Statistics Report in 2011(news.cn, 2012), growth of new loans was 
falling. 
 
Under the rapid change of monetary policy, many small medium 
enterprises and financial programs raised by the RMB4 trillion have to deal 
with the issue of capital chain, meaning that the only choice available is to 
obtain finance from private lending (Hou, 2012). On the other hand, 
commercial banks have to actively develop off-balance sheet activities under 
tight credit control to avoid the regulatory policy and make profits from wealth 
management products, co-operation with trust companies and entrusted loans, 
etc.(Hou, 2012). All of these activities stimulate the development of the 
shadow banking system with enough market demand for the shadow banking 
system’s products and institutions. 
2.2.3 Investment demand 
Deposited money in banks is always a safe and basic form of investment 
for residents and enterprises. However, according to Chen and Zhang (2012), 
the CPI grew by 5% in 2011 while the demand deposit interest rate was only 
0.5% and one year deposit rate at 3.5%. They stated that people were living in 
an age of negative interest as there was an apparent decline in the actual 
income for currency. As a consequence, they preferred to invest in products 
issued by the shadow banking system with more than 10% annual earnings. In 
addition, these wealth management products and trust products have the 
features of strong flexibility, short-term investment and high profitability which 
can meet the demand of investors. Therefore shadow banking has adequate 
sources of fund and can provide a reliable service of credit to the public. 
“Shadow banking is inevitable when there is a growing need for diversified 
financial services which traditional banks can't provide," commented Zhou 
Xiaochuan, Governor of the People's Bank of China, the Country's central 
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bank, at the conference. (China Daily, 2012) 
2.3 Impacts of the Shadow Banking System 
There is much reference in literatures to analysis of the issues of the 
shadow banking system. For instance, Feng and Wang (2011) stated that the 
shadow banking system should be mainly responsible for the global financial 
crisis in 2008, but conversely promoted economic development. Ge (2010) 
stated that the regulatory authority should reform the scope of supervision of 
financial institutions and commercial banks, and they should also be aware of 
the excessive securitization activities of the shadow banking system. Wang 
(2010) claimed that the shadow banking system increases the amount of 
money supply which subsequently impairs the effectiveness of monetary policy 
raised by the central bank. Xu and Zhou (2011) stressed that the activities of 
the shadow banking system lead to an unstable economic situation. More 
details will be shown below. 
2.3.1 The impact of shadow banking system on economic growth 
According to Chen and Zhang (2012), the shadow banking system is one 
approach to resource allocation. They claim that the amount of small medium 
enterprises (SME) applied to 99% of the total enterprises in China, and the 
value of the products and services provided by SME accounted for 60% of 
GDP. These enterprises play a significant role in terms of boosting the 
economy, promoting innovation, export expansion and increasing employment. 
It is undeniable that the shadow banking system has provided a favorable 
financing environment for the development of small medium enterprises. 
Compared to loans provided by commercial banks, the specific lending 
mechanism of the shadow banking system also creates enormous market 
risks. In ideal conditions, a successful investment will provide the small 
medium enterprises with sufficient funding to make a profit, to allow 
development and to pay any debts. However, if the investment fails, these 
enterprises will face unpayable debts due to the high lending interest rate. It 
can be seen that the shadow banking system is a double-edged sword in the 
economic development. 
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2.3.2 The impact of the shadow banking system on monetary policy 
2.3.2.1 The impacts on credit supply and money supply 
According to Cao and Lin (2005), by analyzing the performance of 
monetary policy in China, they concluded that the main transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy in China was the credit conduction mechanism 
implying that credit supply is playing a significant role in the monetary policy 
raised by the central bank in China. Moreover, Li and Wu (2011) analyzed the 
challenge of shadow banking’s functions on the monetary policy in China from 
the view of credit creation and introduced the process of credit creation of the 
shadow banking system. They stated that securitization products were private 
money which was not created by the central bank. The securitization product is 
like a new form of money which will affect the monetary liquidity which is used 
to level the money supply by the central bank, consequently affecting the 
monetary policy of the central bank. 
Other than the analysis of impacts from the credit creation function of the 
shadow banking system, impacts from the view of the credit scale on monetary 
policy can also be analyzed. The shadow banking system usually provides 
money for small medium enterprises which then increase the amount of credit 
supply and influences the effectiveness of monetary policy raised by the 
central bank to control the credit scale. Owing to China’s specific background 
of monetary policy, Hou (2012) proposed that it was difficult for small medium 
enterprises to obtain loans and that shadow banking has positive functions for 
the financing of these enterprises, but can still have limitations compared to 
conventional commercial banks. Wang (2010) analyzed the impact of shadow 
banking system on the money supply in China, from statistics showing the 
exact size of credit supply in the commercial banks’ financial products market. 
Results show that the credit scale of commercial banks in 2010 was influenced 
by the activities of shadow banking and that the amount of credit supply 
exceeded the limit regulated by the central bank. This consequently affected 
the regulation and implementation of the central bank on monetary policy.  
 
Furthermore, Xu (2009) introduced an equation: L=NM, where L is the 
amount of fund demand in market, N is the velocity of money activity and M is 
the money stock. He claimed that it was difficult for the central bank to achieve 
the ultimate goal of monetary policy by implementing money supply as the 
intermediate target. The reason given is that the central bank can control the 
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money stock but cannot directly control the velocity of money following the 
emergence of shadow banking system, which increases the velocity of money 
by securitization and participation of financial institutions. He stated that the 
efficacy of credit diffusion and market liquidity was determined by the velocity 
of money under the process of securitization, and that there would be lots of 
factors which could influence the velocity of money. He also illustrated the 
impact of securitization by introducing the case of FED, “the FED used M1 as 
intermediate target of monetary policy since 1979, but in 1980s they found that 
the relationship between money supply and nominal GPD, inflation was 
becoming unreliable while it was also the booming period for financial 
securitization. As a consequence, the FED announced that they will stop using 
money supply as the operational guideline of monetary policy in 1993.” 
2.3.2.2 The impacts on the monetary policy instrument 
Chenand Zhang(2012) also stated the effectiveness of the central bank’s 
monetary policy would be affected during the period of development of the 
shadow banking system. They argued that, “the shadow banking system is 
outside the bank regulation and supervision; it has more flexibility to provide 
loans than traditional banks.” While the central bank increases the benchmark 
of lending rates to restrain the inflation rate and high demand for investment, 
the scale of entrusted loans and trust loans will grow rapidly under the 
motivation of high profits which implies that demanders would borrow money 
from the shadow banking system instead of traditional banks. Therefore the 
goal of tightening the money supply cannot be fully achieved as was the 
original expectation of the central bank. Meanwhile, with the existence of extra 
loan providers (the shadow banking system), the effectiveness of the limitation 
on the credit scale raised by the central bank would be influenced and could 
not achieve its original goals. 
 
Yu and Zhang (2011) claimed that the great loss of deposits would also 
affect the implementation of required reserve. The reserve requirement is a 
tool of the central bank to control the amount of money supply and credit 
supply. It was put into effect at the expectation of regulators who believed that 
the higher rate of reserve requirement should result in a lower loan balance. 
However the growth of credit demand cannot be reduced by the 
implementation of high required reserve, another impact of the shadow 
banking system. Yu and Zhang (2011), by analyzing the average required 
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reserve and excess deposits from 2000-2011, pointed out that high reserve 
requirements would lead to a deposit loss in the banking system as people 
favored the shadow banking system. The fall in deposits would also pose 
increasing challenges to liquidity management for the banking sector.  
Li (2013) analyzed the implementation of reserve requirement and stated 
that the government of China implemented the tight monetary policy in order to 
control the rapid growth of economy and restrain inflation caused by the easy 
monetary policy in 2009. The central bank increased its ratio of reserve 
requirement 12 times during the period from January of 2010 to June of 2011, 
but the consequences of these implementations were not optimistic. She 
claimed that the reason down to the activities of the shadow banking system 
which accrued large deposits but avoided the restraints of reserve requirement 
and hence flowed into private lending, trust companies and wealth 
management products issued by the banks. 
 
According to Xu (2012), who analyzed China’s economic situation in 2011,  
there was an inevitability of rapid expansion of shadow banking’s credit scale. 
He also analyzed the double-track system of interest rate and found a 
significant difference between the folk lending rate and the benchmark interest 
rate. He also stated that the reduction of commercial banks’ credit funds as a 
result of the implementation of tight monetary policy was the reason why small 
medium enterprises turn to high interest rate private lending. As a result of the 
fund demand of small medium enterprises, the interest margin is expanded 
and can affect the monetary policy instruments of central bank on benchmark 
interest rate. 
According to Borst (2013), driving the rapid growth of wealth management 
products was a form of regulatory arbitrage to circumvent China’s policy of low 
interest rates on deposits. Low interest rates are designed to sterilize foreign 
currency market intervention whilst keeping the banks profitable. This policy 
has not however been as beneficial for depositors as the actual income from 
deposits is negative during a period of low deposit rate and high inflation. Borst 
stated that the main alternatives to traditional deposit are real estate 
investment and wealth management products but the latter are more liquid 
than real estate investment and as a result, people prefer to place their money 
in wealth management products as a deposit-like investment. Furthermore, 
Borst suggested that depositors who invested their money in wealth 
management products would be unlikely to revert to traditional bank deposits 
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even when the interest rate is liberalized by the policy of central bank. He 
claimed that it was due to a combination of investors' habit and the ability of 
these funds to continue offering returns higher than those available on 
traditional bank deposits. 
 
Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) analyzed the impact of interest rates 
(short-term and long-term) on lending standards via securitization activities, 
including these variables in the baseline regression. The results show that the 
impact of interest rates in the Euro area on the softening of lending standards 
is amplified by securitization activities and higher securitization leads to softer 
lending standards for mortgages. Results however highlighted a difference to 
the results in the U.S. where the interaction between long-term rates and 
securitization is not clear. This suggests that securitization may reduce the 
effect of long-term interest rates on lending standards. 
 
Furthermore, Xu and Zhou (2011) pointed out that the development of the 
shadow banking system has influenced the effectiveness of China’s monetary 
policy, through their analysis of the shadow banking system, which extends 
financial instability through the five mechanisms and connects it with the 
corresponding strategy of FED. Chen and Zhang (2012) similarly analyzed the 
interactions of the scale of the shadow banking system with economic growth, 
the effectiveness of monetary policy and the money supply respectively. They 
applied the short-term constraints of the SVAR model which uses monthly 
growth rates of CPI as variables for the effectiveness of monetary policy, 
monthly growth rates of GDP as variables for economic growth, monthly 
growth rates of M1 as variables for  the amount of money supply and also 
uses monthly growth rates of the amount of trust loans and entrusted loans as 
variables for shadow banking, respectively. They purported that the shadow 
banking system will increase money supply in China but  that there is no 
significant effect on inflation. 
2.4 Summary of the review of literature 
The shadow banking system plays the same role as conventional 
commercial banks but is difficult to be regulated and supervised by the banking 
sector. It has more flexibility to provide loans to the public compared to 
commercial banks and owing to specific circumstances in China, the shadow 
banking system has its own characteristics quite different to those in other 
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developed countries. As a consequence of China's specific circumstances and 
regulation, the shadow banking system is good at providing money for small 
medium enterprises and for the collection of funds from bank deposits owing to 
its high interest rate which could encourage depositors to purchase financial 
products of the shadow banking system instead of depositing money in 
conventional banks. Furthermore, because of the flexibility of the shadow 
banking system, the monetary policy cannot achieve its original goals. The 
extra loan supply from the shadow banking system could influence the 
implementation of monetary policy on financial instrument, such as interest 
rate, reserve requirement, the amount of loan supply and money supply, etc. It 
can be seen from the results of historical literatures how the shadow banking 
system affects the monetary policy and this paper will endeavor to 
systematically analyze some of these effects. 
 
3. Methodology 
This section introduces how data for the present study was collected. 
3.1 Research Design 
It can be seen from the literature review that there are different effects of 
monetary policy under different economic climates because monetary policy 
and banks’ liquidity would change under different economic climates, and 
shadow banking system has played a significant role in the World's economy. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of shadow banking system 
on monetary policy. There are two main parts to the methods which will be 
applied in order to achieve the goals of this paper. The first part is the 
Structural Vector Auto Regression model (SVAR), the outcomes of which are 
impulse response and variance decomposition and which provide a clear 
relationship among the selected variables. However the establishment of the 
SVAR model needs to be based on the corresponding Vector Auto Regression 
model (VAR). Moreover, the feasibility of this transformation from VAR to SVAR 
is determined by the serial stability of the VAR model. Thus a VAR model will 
be established based on the selected variables and then the stability of the 
created VAR model will be tested by means of an AR roots table. The SVAR 
model would provide impulse response and variance decomposition if the VAR 
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model is stable (Gao, 2009). The combined data of shadow banking (total 
loans), economic growth (GDP), CPI, cost of borrowing and lending 
(short-term interest rate) and money supply (M1) will be analyzed. However 
this will not reflect the total impact of shadow banking. Therefore a simple 
analysis will be carried out of the relationship between the shadow banking 
system and other variables. Consequently the second part consists of 
Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS), correlation analysis and underlying 
trend analysis. 
3.1.1 Structural vector auto regression 
In this paper, it is necessary to consider the contemporaneous relationship 
among the variables, which can provide evidence to show how the shadow 
banking system affects the monetary policy within a certain time frame. 
Variables are not only affected by their own lag value but are also influenced 
by other contemporaneous variables at the same time. Implementation of the 
structural vector auto regression model (SVAR) is therefore applied to solve 
this potential problem to a certain extent. As its name suggests, this model can 
capture the instantaneous constitutive relationship between the variables in 
the system. 
 
The SVAR with p lags is defined as: 
𝐵0𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝐵1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝐵𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜖𝑡        (3.3) 
Where 𝑦𝑡 is a k × 1 vector of endogenous variable for k = 1,…,K , 𝑐0 is a 
k × 1 vector of constants, the coefficient matrices 𝐵𝑖 are structural coefficients 
(k × k matrices for 𝑖 = 1,…,𝑝) and 𝜖𝑡 is a k × 1 vector of error terms (white 
noise). 
The equation (3.3) can be converted to: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵0
−1𝑐0 + 𝐵0
−1𝐵1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐵0
−1𝐵2𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝐵0
−1𝐵𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐵0
−1𝜖𝑡  (3.4) 
When 𝐵0
−1𝑐0= c , 𝐵0
−1𝐵𝑖=𝐴𝑖, and 𝐵0
−1𝜖𝑡=𝑒𝑡, 
One obtains the reduced form VAR:  
𝑦𝑡 = c + 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑒𝑡         (3.1) 
As a consequence, the reduced form residuals can be retrieved from a 
SVAR model by𝑒𝑡 = 𝐵0
−1𝜖𝑡, and its covariance matrix by ∑ 𝑒 = 𝐸(𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑡
′) =
𝐸(𝐵0
−1𝜖𝑡𝜖𝑡
′(𝐵0
−1)′) = 𝐵0
−1 ∑(𝐵0
−1)′ (3.5) 
Thus, the SVAR model can be gained after the estimation of the VAR 
model through the inner link between the SVAR model and the corresponding 
VAR model. 
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3.1.2Ordinary least squares regression analysis, correlation analysis and 
underlying trend analysis 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression can be used to estimate the 
linear relationship between two series variables. For instance, the relationship 
between response variables Y and explanatory X (shadow banking system) 
could be presented as: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽0(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚)       (3.6) 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0; 𝐻1: 𝛽1 ≠ 0 
The testable hypothesis is whether the performance of shadow banking 
system differs significantly from the chosen variables. 
The null hypothesis (𝐻0): there is no significant difference between the 
performance of shadow banking system and the chosen variables. The 
alternative hypothesis (𝐻1): there is a difference between the performance of 
the shadow banking system and the chosen variables. 
 
Correlation coefficient is normally used to simplify the interpretation of the 
degree of the linear relationship between two variable series. 
It is a relative measure of co-movements between variables: 
Correlation coefficient (AB) = 𝜌𝐴𝐵
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝐴𝐵)
𝜎𝐴𝜎𝐵
             (3.7) 
Trend analysis is used solely to show the vague relationship between 
two or more variables, it is not conclusive. It is however useful to analyse the 
variables by graphs along side the methods listed above.  
3.2 Data Description 
For analyzing the impacts of the shadow banking system in China, this 
paper utilizes in excess of 12 years’ data from February 2002 to April 2013. 
There are 147 observed values in each variable which will be analyzed by the 
SVAR model and the data found from this period is considered sufficient to 
analyze how the shadow banking system affects monetary policy. The 
collected data from China, for the analysis of SVAR model, includes GDP, CPI, 
money supply, total loans and short-term interest rates. In order to explicitly 
reveal the relationship among variables by the SVAR model, all the data 
should be analyzed monthly by growth rate. China’s data for the analysis of 
OLS regression, trend analysis and correlation analysis, is collected as a 
growth rate annually from August 2003 to April 2013, including total loans, total 
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deposits, household savings deposits, M1and M2. The value of lending 
interest rate and deposit interest rate will also be directly used. 
3.2.1 Shadow banking system 
The total loans will be selected as indicators for the shadow banking 
system from the Wind database. It includes trust loans and entrusted loans 
which can show the role and rough size of the shadow banking system in the 
financial world.  
3.2.2 The effectiveness of the monetary policy 
The consumer price index could reflect the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy, the increase in the CPI means the implementation of easy monetary 
policy, andvice versa. (Collected from EIU). 
3.2.3 Economic growth rate 
There is no monthly GPD provided by government or any other country 
database, so i the industrial production index will be used to indicate the 
monthly growth rate of the GDP. (Collected from EIU) 
3.2.4 Money supply 
According to the money definition in China, M0 is cash currency in 
circulation; M1 is M0 plus checkable demand deposit; M2 is M1 plus most 
savings deposits including household saving, fixed deposits, and 
money-market deposits (Pbc.gov.cn, 2012). Consequently, M1 is more suitable 
to analyze the impact of the shadow banking system on money supply in the 
SVAR model. (Collected from EIU). In addition, the relationship between 
shadow banking and M2 will be analyzed in an OLS regression, correlation 
analysis and underlying trend analysis. 
3.2.5 The cost of borrowing and lending 
Short-term interest rate will be selected as the indicator of opportunity cost 
of lending (Collected from EIU). The higher short-term interest rate reflects the 
higher cost of borrowing and lending. The lending interest rate is working 
capital loans of one-year maturity, and the deposit interest rate is interest rate 
of institutional and individual deposits, with a one-year maturity. 
 16 
 
3.2.6 Deposits 
Total deposits indicate the amount of deposits including household 
savings deposit and other deposits, and household savings deposits would 
indicate the value of individual deposits. 
3.3 Instrumentation 
Eviews 7.2 will be applied in the SVAR model. It is normally used for 
general statistical analysis and econometric analysis such as time series 
estimation and forecasting. The rest of the methods will be analyzed in Excel 
including OLS regression, underlying trend analysis and correlation analysis. 
3.4 Validity and reliability 
Some of the data collection is approximate implying that the process of 
analysis may not be correct, such as monthly GPD indicated by the industrial 
production index, index of the shadow banking system indicated by total loans 
including short-term and long-term loans. However, the chosen approximate 
data is the main determinants of change in the variables which also implies 
these data can be seen as representative for the monthly GPD, index of 
shadow banking system and so on. Therefore the data collected from the EIU 
country database and the Wind database provide validity and reliability. 
3.5 Summary 
It can be concluded that this paper will apply two main part methods to 
analyze the impact of shadow banking on the monetary policy. The SVAR is an 
overall method to provide impulse response and variance decomposition for 
the collected simultaneous variables including monthly GPD, CPI, M1, total 
loans and short-term interest rates. It is helpful to analyze the relationships in 
the dynamic system which include the shadow banking system, economic 
growth and the effectiveness of monetary policy. The combined methods of 
OLS regression, trend analysis and correlation analysis are some easier 
methods by which to analyze the impacts of shadow banking on individual 
economic indicators. It is helpful to understand the different degrees of impact 
on various aspects. 
 
All the data is collected from the Wind database or the EIU country 
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database during the period between February 2002 and April 2013 and then 
this data would be applied to the software of Eviews 7.2 and Excel to be 
analyzed by the methods mentioned above. The results and discussion will be 
presented in the next section, including impulse response, variance 
decomposition, OLS regression, correlation coefficient and graph of trends. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
This section presents and discusses the outcomes from the selected 
methodology to provide an appropriate means with which to analyze impacts 
of the shadow banking system on the monetary policy and economic growth in 
China. The outcomes will be discussed one by one according to the process of 
methodology, including the outcomes from the SVAR model ( impulse 
response and variance decomposition), OLS regression, correlation analysis 
and underlying trend analysis. 
4.1 Outcomes from the SVAR Model 
4.1.1 The process of SVAR 
As stated in the Methodology, data for the SVAR model is collected from 
the Wind database and EIU country database (see appendix 1). Moreover, to 
gain a SVAR model by applying Eviews 7.2, we need first to estimate a VAR 
model first , to test its stability and determine its lag order. 
After the collected data is imported to the Eviews 7.2, it is opened as a 
VAR model (see appendix 2) and this requires serial stability which can be 
tested by AR roots in the table shown below:  
 
Table 4-1: AR roots table 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: CPI RATE RGDP RM1 RSB  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 2 
Date: 09/06/13   Time: 22:05 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.939458 - 0.080135i  0.942870 
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 0.939458 + 0.080135i  0.942870 
 0.528395  0.528395 
 0.348612  0.348612 
 0.120600 - 0.292318i  0.316218 
 0.120600 + 0.292318i  0.316218 
-0.064857 - 0.264893i  0.272717 
-0.064857 + 0.264893i  0.272717 
-0.233165 - 0.066809i  0.242548 
-0.233165 + 0.066809i  0.242548 
  
  Data source: EIU country 
database, Wind database,  
  
All the roots are less than 1 which implies that there is no root lying 
outside the unit circle. It can be seen that this VAR model satisfies the stability 
condition. Furthermore, another important problem in SVAR model is to 
determine the lag order. This model is judged by AIC, SC criteria to select the 
best order. As table 4.2 shown below, suggests, order 1 is the best according 
to the value of SC as order 1 is lowest.  
 
Table 4-2: Lag Length Criteria 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: CPI RATE RGDP RM1 RSB     
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 09/06/13   Time: 23:11     
Sample: 1 147      
Included observations: 139     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  2046.854 NA   1.20e-19 -29.37919 -29.27363 -29.33629 
1  2442.742  757.5996  5.77e-22 -34.71572  -34.08238*  -34.45834* 
2  2471.985  53.85652  5.43e-22 -34.77676 -33.61563 -34.30491 
3  2496.968  44.21568  5.45e-22 -34.77652 -33.08762 -34.09020 
4  2521.578  41.78315  5.52e-22 -34.77090 -32.55422 -33.87010 
5  2549.864  45.99056  5.32e-22 -34.81819 -32.07372 -33.70291 
6  2576.590  41.53168  5.27e-22 -34.84303 -31.57077 -33.51327 
7  2604.026   40.65955*   5.21e-22* -34.87807 -31.07803 -33.33383 
8  2630.594  37.46305  5.24e-22  -34.90063* -30.57281 -33.14192 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
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Data source: EIU country database, Wind database,    
 
In the end, the SVAR model could be established as (see appendix 3):  
𝐵0𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝐵1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡                 (4.1) 
Where 𝑦𝑡= [CPI, RATE, RGDP, RM1, RSB]. 
4.1.2 Impulse response 
The impulse response functions are obtained from the SVAR model, to 
reflect an error, or the reaction of any dynamic system in response to some 
external change. For instance, in this paper it would reflect a dynamic effect of 
the shadow banking system on other variables, including the amount of money 
supply, CPI, GDP. 
4.1.2.1 Response to the development of shadow banking system 
Performance indicators of the shadow banking system are represented by 
the monthly growth rate of the total loans, and the shock of its changing to 
other variables is named shock 5. 
 
Figure 4-1: Response of CPI to Shock 5 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database 
The monthly growth rate of CPI is to indicate the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy. From Figure 4.1, it can be seen that CPI is affected by the 
shadow banking units and it drop rapidly to the maximum value of the negative 
effects (approximately -0.01%) in period-2, and then slowly rising, reaching 
towards zero, but it has been less than zero which implies that the 
development  of the shadow banking system has some negative effect on 
 20 
 
CPI. However, the impact of the shadow banking system on CPI would 
gradually lessen with  the passage of time and the impact can be ignored 
after 9 months. This illustrates that the development of shadow banking has a 
lagged effect on the CPI.  
Figure 4-2: Response of RGDP to Shock 5 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database 
As shown in Figure 4.2, the RGDP indicates economic growth, it is 
represented by the monthly industrial production index. After the RGDP 
experiences the shocks of the shadow banking system, there is a decline in 
the GDP growth rate in period-2 which reaches the maximum of negative 
effects -0.02%, and then rebounds to a positive number. To the end of period-6, 
the effect tends to remain at zero. This illustrates that the development of 
shadow banking has played a negative role in economic development, but in 
comparison, the positive effect on economic development is more evident in 
the long term. 
Figure 4-3: Response of RM1 to Shock 5 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database 
Figure 4.3 shows the shocks of the shadow banking system on the 
monthly growth rate of M1. After the RM1 experiences the shocks of the 
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shadow banking system, the growth rate of M1 slow down and reach the 
lowest value in period-2, but then rebounds to a positive number in period-3. In 
period 4, the impact tends to remain at zero. This illustrates that the 
development of the shadow banking system will have a negative impact on the 
amount of money supply within the first 2 months, but the impact will be 
positive in the next period. The effect of shocks would disappear after 4 
months. 
4.2.1.2 Response of the development of the shadow banking system 
Figure 4-4: Response of RSB 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database 
As shown in Figure 4.4, the shocks of CPI (shock 1) to the monthly growth 
rate of the shadow banking system indicate that there is a positive impact 
initially and then it drops slowly to negative effects during period-3, and it tends 
to zero in period-4. This means that an increase in inflation will have a negative 
impact on the development size of the shadow banking system. The increase 
of CPI indicates the implementation of easy macro-monetary policy, while it 
also indicates that shadow banking reduced in size to a certain extent due to 
the high cost of financing. This is consistent with actual phenomena in the real 
economy. 
 
The shocks of short-term interest rate (shock 2) indicate that the impact is 
positive in the first place and then quickly turns negative, tending to zero in 
period 6. It illustrates that if the central bank increases the cost of borrowing, 
shadow banking will increase in the short term but will need to expand rapidly 
during the next 7 months. In general, it can be concluded that the high cost of 
borrowing in the market will increase the size of shadow banking. 
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The growth rate of GPD (shock 3) would also affect the size of shadow 
banking, after giving a positive impact initially, the impact turning into a 
negative one in period 2 and tending to zero in period 6. It illustrates that 
economic development will also promote growth of the shadow banking 
system in the short-term (i.e. about 2 months). 
 
From the shocks of M1 (shock 4), it can be seen that the impact of errors 
is positive in period-1 and then decreases gradually in the period-2 to zero. It 
illustrates that the easy monetary policy will evoke the development of shadow 
banking system. 
4.1.3 Variance decomposition 
The variance decomposition is used to indicate the amount of information 
each variable contributes to the other variables in the auto regression model. It 
determines how much of the forecast error variance of each of the variables 
can be explained by exogenous shocks to the other variables (Lütkepohl, H., 
2007).  
Table 4-3: Variance decomposition of CPI 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database 
As shown in Table 4.3, the impact of the shadow banking system on the 
changing of CPI can be ignored in the first two months. From Period-3, the 
impact significantly rises to 4.75% and reaches the highest value of 5.19% in 
the Period-7. It can be seen that although the shadow banking system has a 
certain impact on CPI movements, the influence is limited. 
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Table 4-4: Variance decomposition of RGDP 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database 
As shown in Table 4.4, there is no impact of the shadow banking system 
on the growth rate of GDP in the period-1 but since period-2 the impact is 
noteworthy, and then it has a decline trend as shown. However the figure is still 
much lower than that of other variables which implies that the development of 
the shadow banking system has a positive effect on growth of GDP but is not 
clearly evident one..  
 
Table 4-5: Variance decomposition of RM1 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database 
As shown in Table 4.5, the percentage of changing in the shadow banking 
system reach edits the maximum value in period-5, about 2.66%. It then 
remains at around 2.65% until period-10 implying that development of  the 
shadow banking system has affected the national macro-monetary policy to 
some extent. 
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Table 4-6: Variance decomposition of RSB 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database 
To sum up the variance decomposition of RM1 and CPI, it can be seen 
that the development of shadow banking did indeed impact on the amount of 
money supply to some extent, but the impact on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy (CPI) is not obvious. From Table 4.6, it can be seen that all of the 
impacts from other variables on the development of shadow banking system 
are not obvious, only 3-5% in RGDP, around 3% in RATE, 2.7 % in RM1 and 
about 1% in CPI. 
4.1.4 Discussion of the above results 
From the impulse responses of CPI, GPD, and M1 to the development of 
the shadow banking system, it is noted that the shadow banking system 
indeed has impacts on these variables. However, the impacts on RM1 and CPI 
are antilogous during the period 2-4. Although, it still can be said that the 
development of shadow banking could promote the amount of money supply in 
a long term (about 3 months later) and increase the growth rate of CPI in the 
first 2 months, this implies that the easy monetary policy would be promoted by 
the activities of shadow banking, and conversely the tight monetary policy 
would be ruined by the activities of the shadow banking system too. However, 
the results of the variance decomposition RM1 and CPI are not satisfactory; 
the changing in RM1 and CPI can be explained by shadow banking at only 
around 5% and 2.5% respectively. Therefore, the impacts of shadow banking 
on monetary policy and the amount of money supply are not so strong. 
Additionally, the impulse response also shows that the shadow banking 
system could promote economic growth in the long term but the variance 
decomposition suggests than the impact is not obvious. 
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From the impulse responses of shadow banking, it is noted that the 
shadow banking system would be promoted in growth by the increase of GPD 
and implementation of easy monetary policy, but it would be reduced in growth 
rate due to the high cost of financing. In addition, the variance decomposition 
of shadow banking system indicates the impacts from GPD, M1, CPI, RATE 
are weak. All in all, there are impacts of the shadow banking system on other 
variables. The impacts are however, as the results shown are weak; may be 
due to the collection of data. The shadow banking system is indicated by the 
total loans collected from the Wind database which includes entrusted loans, 
trust loans and bank loans, etc. but only trust loans and entrusted loans could 
be counted into the shadow banking system. Furthermore, the amount of 
entrust loans and trust loans is just a part of the shadow banking system,  
which in China should also include private loans, non-banking financial 
institutions such as trust companies and pawnshops, etc. Therefore the actual 
value of shadow banking should be bigger than the chosen data of total loans 
which implies the impacts might not as weak as shown in the variance 
decomposition. 
 
4.2 The outcomes from OLS regression, correlation analysis 
and underlying trend analysis 
4.2.1 The relationship between shadow banking and money supply 
As the purpose of this study is to analyze the impacts of  the shadow 
banking system on monetary policy, in this section OLS regression, correlation 
analysis and underlying trend analysis will be used to find out the relationship 
between the credit scale and the amount of money supply from August, 2003 
to April, 2013. The data will be collected as a growth rate year on year. 
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Figure 4-5: The growth rate of total loans and M1 and M2 (year on year) 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database 
From Figure 4.5, it can be seen than the movements of the growth rate of 
M1 and M2 are almost the same as that of the total loans. That they have a 
positive relationship implies that when total loans go up, the M1 and M2 will go 
up too, andvice versa. It can be simply concluded that the shadow banking 
system, indicated by total loans has an impact on the money supply.  
 
Table 4-7: Correlation coefficient of total loans, M1 and M2 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database 
 
Furthermore, Table 4.7 shows the correlation coefficient of total loans with 
M1 and M2. The correlation value of the total loans and M1 is 0.656802 
implying that they have positive relationship, and 1 unit change in the growth 
rate of loans would lead to 0.656802 change in the growth rate of M1. What is 
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more, the correlation between total loans and M2 is 0.802205 which indicates 
that the 1 unit point increase in the growth rate of total loans will lead to 
0.802205 change in the growth rate of M2. This is positive too and illustrates 
that there are more impacts of the shadow banking system on the M2 
compared to M1, because the relationship between total loans and M2 is 
stronger than the relationship between total loans and M1. 
 
Table 4-8: Outcomes of OLS regression of total loans(X) and M1 and M2 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database 
 
As shown in Table 4.8, the coefficient value of loans in the equation 
between total loans and M1 is 0.891249581, which indicates that they have a 
positive relationship and the one percentage change in the growth rate of total 
loans will result in 0.891249581 changes in the growth rate of M1. The p-value 
of 8.91989E-16 indicates the chance of the coefficient equal to zero, therefore 
8.91989E-16 is much lower than 0.05 implying that the null hypothesis 
(𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0) should be strongly rejected. Then it can be concluded that there is 
significant impact of shadow banking system on the M1.  
 
Furthermore, the coefficient value of loan in M2 is 0.589686078 which 
means than there will be 0.5896860789 changes in the growth rate of M2 if the 
growth rate of total loans changed by one percentage, and they have a positive 
relation. In addition, its p-value is 1.60506E-27 indicates that the coefficient 
value equal to or higher than the estimated coefficient will be expected to occur 
1.60506461863783E-25% of the time by random. So the null hypothesis 
(𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0) should be rejected. Then it can be said that there is a significant 
impact of shadow banking system on the M2. 
 
As a consequence from the analysis of the relationship between shadow 
banking and money supply by applying OLS regression, correlation analysis 
and underlying trend analysis, it can be seen that there is indeed an impact of 
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value
Loan 0.891249581 8.91989E-16 0.589686078 1.60506E-27
Intercept -0.0008419 0.96279068 0.080571446 2.47645E-18
M1 M2
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shadow banking on the amount of money supply. According to the 
Methodology, M1 is cash currency in circulation plus checkable demand 
deposit and M2 is M1 plus savings deposits including household saving, fixed 
deposits and money-market deposit. From the results of correlation coefficient, 
it can be clearly seen than the impact of shadow banking system on the M2 
should be higher than the impact on M1. However the results of OLS 
regression suggest that M1 should be easier influenced by the shadow 
banking system compared to M2, and the intercept in the equation of total 
loans and M1 should equal zero and the intercept in the equation of total loans 
and M2 should be 0.08. It can be concluded therefore that the shadow banking 
system could impact not only on the amount of cash in circulation but also on 
the amount of deposits in the banks. 
4.2.2 The relationship between the shadow banking system and deposits 
To analyze the impact of shadow banking system on the monetary policy, 
in this section the relationships among total loans, household savings and total 
deposits will be measured. 
Figure 4-6: The growth rate of total deposits, total loans and household 
savings deposits 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database, PBC 
As shown in Figure 4.6, the movements of these three indicators are 
similar although the growth rate of household saving deposits dropped rapidly 
from November 2005 to January 2008, and there is upward trend in the growth 
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rate of total loans and total deposits in the same period. It can be concluded 
that the growth of total deposits relied upon the other deposits such as 
deposits of non-financial enterprises and trust deposits, etc. From this one 
could determine that the money transfer from household saving deposits to the 
deposits of non-financial enterprises and trust deposits, etc. might be due to 
the activities of the shadow banking system. Additionally, the upward trend of 
the growth rate of total loans implies that people prefer to invest their money in 
wealth management products issued by the shadow banking system instead of 
deposits.  
 
Table 4-9: Correlation coefficient of total loans, total deposits and 
household savings deposits 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database, PBC. 
From Table 4.9, one can see that the correlation between total deposit tan 
total loans is 0.084017255 which implies that there would be a 0.834017255 
change in the growth rate of total deposits if the growth rate of total loans 
changes by 1 point. Furthermore, the correlation value of 0.513448204 
between total loans and household savings deposits implies that 1 point unit 
change in the growth rate of total loans would lead to 0.513448204 change in 
the growth rate of household saving deposits which is much lower than the 
correlation value between total deposits and total loans. 
 
Table 4-10: Outcomes of OLS regression of total loans, total deposits and 
household saving deposits 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database, PBC. 
Total Deposits Total Loans
Total Deposits 1
Total Loans 0.834017255 1
Household savings deposits0.593068246 0.513448204
Household savings deposits
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value
Intercept 0.0703568 1.6673E-16 0.079862073 2.0048E-07
Loan 0.630469284 1.0093E-31 0.477953613 6.04667E-09
Total deposit
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As shown in Table 4.10, the coefficients of total loans in the equation 
between total loans(X) and total deposit (Y) is 0.630469284 which implies that 
they have a positive relationship and 1 point unit change in the growth rate of 
total loans would lead to 0.0630469284 change in the growth rate of total 
deposits. Additionally, the p-value of 1.0093E-31 means the chance of 
coefficients equals zero, which is much lower than 0.05, implying that the null 
hypothesis (𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0)should be rejected. Thus it can be noted that the total 
loans has an impact on total deposits. Moreover, the coefficient between total 
loans and household saving deposits is 0.477953613 which implies that they 
have a positive relationship there would be 0.477953613 change in the growth 
rate of household savings deposits if the growth rate of total loans changes 1 
percentage. In addition, the p-value of 6.04667E-09 implies that a value equal 
to or higher than the estimated coefficient will be expected to occur 
6.04666878594798E-07% of the time by random, thus the null hypothesis 
(𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0) should be rejected when the sample coefficient is not equal to 
zero if the p-value is greater than 0.05. So, it can be concluded that the total 
loans would have an impact on the household deposits. 
 
From the results above, it can be seen than the total loans have impacts 
on the total deposits and household saving deposits. However it has different 
impacts in different periods. From the trend analysis it can be seen that during 
the period from November 2005 to January 2008, the relationship between 
household saving deposits and total loans is negative and implies that the 
activities of the shadow banking system have an impact on household savings 
deposits. However from the analysis of OLS regression and correlation, the 
relationships among total loans, total deposits and household savings deposits 
are all positive during the whole sample period of August 2003 to December 
2012. This may be due to the data collection, because the total loans not only 
include the trust loans and entrusted loans issued by the shadow banking 
system but also include the loans issued by conventional banks. Therefore it 
can be concluded that the amount of total loans has a positive impact on total 
deposits and household savings deposits but the negative impacts of total 
loans on household saving deposits during the same period would be as a 
result of the activities of shadow banking, because the higher interest rate of 
products issued by the shadow banking system would attract people to invest 
in wealth management products instead of saving deposits in banks. 
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4.2.3 The relationship between total loans and benchmark lending 
interest rate, total deposits and deposit interest rate 
Figure 4-7: Lending interest rate and the growth rate of total loans 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database 
As shown in Figure 4.7, it can be seen that both lending interest rate and 
total loans have an upward trend in the period from November 2005 to 
February 2008. This implies that even if the central bank implement the tight 
monetary policy by increasing the lending interest rate to reduce the credit 
scale, the loans balance of financial institutions will still have an upward trend 
during this period. It might be due to the activities of the shadow banking 
system, because the fund demanders would borrow money from the shadow 
banking system rather than conventional banks due to the limited credit scale 
caused by the high lending rate. Moreover, the same situation occurred in the 
period from November 2011 to August 2012. 
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Figure 4-8: Deposit interest rate and the growth rate of total loans and 
household saving deposits 
 
Data source: EIU country database, Wind database, PBC. 
From Figure 4.8, it can be seen that there is a negative relationship 
between the household savings deposits and deposit interest rate during the 
period from February 2006 to October 2007. This implies that even if the 
central bank tries to attract the money in circulation to deposit in banks by 
increasing the deposit interest rate, the growth rate of household savings 
deposits will still have a downward trend which might be due to the activities of 
the shadow banking system because people would rather invest in the high 
return rate products than deposits, and the products of the shadow banking 
system are more liquid and profitable than a deposit. 
4.3 Summary of the data analyses 
The results of impulse response and variance decomposition illustrate that 
the shadow banking system has impacts on the monetary policy and economic 
growth by influencing the indicators of CPI, M1and GDP, but these impacts are 
not strong which might be as a result of the data collection methods. Total 
loans include trust loans and entrusted loans which belong to the activities of 
the shadow banking system. However it also includes loans issued by the 
conventional banks. Therefore the results might be not correct but can still 
reflect the role of shadow banking in the economic world to some extent. 
Because, as a part of the loans balance, the amount of trust loans and 
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entrusted loans would reflect the trend of the loans balance, and vice versa. 
Moreover, the results of OLS regression, trend analysis and correlation 
illustrate that the shadow banking system would affect the deposits and money 
supply to some extent which implies that the effectiveness of monetary policy 
could be influenced by the shadow banking system. 
5. Conclusions and Recommendation 
This paper has investigated the role of the shadow banking system in 
China’s financial system from the perspective of its differences with 
conventional commercial banks and foreign shadow banking systems. It has 
shown clearly that the shadow banking system in China has its own 
characteristics compared to the more conventional commercial banks or the 
foreign shadow banking system. In China, the shadow banking system is 
mainly composed of 1) off-balance sheets activities of commercial banks, such 
as wealth management products 2) non-banking financial institutions, such as 
trust companies, micro-credit companies and mortgage companies and 3) 
informal finance. Moreover, from the view of the cause of emergence of  the 
shadow banking system, it can be seen that this system has played a 
significant role in the China’s economy.  
The present study was designed to determine the effect of the shadow 
banking system on monetary policy and to identify its role in China’s monetary 
and financial system. Therefore to achieve the goal of this paper, the proposed 
variances and methodologies were investigated from by researching previous 
studies about the shadow banking system carried out by different scholars, for 
instance Chen & Zhang (2012), Li &Wu (2011), Wang (2010), Yu & Zhang 
(2011), Borst (2013), Xu and Zhou (2011) and Maddaloni&Peydró (2011), etc. 
Finally the SVAR model was selected to analyze the contemporaneous 
relationship among related variables in the dynamic system. Based on 
economic theory, the applied variables in the SVAR model are presented as 
growth rate month-on-month including total loans (indicating the shadow 
banking system), CPI (indicating the effectiveness of monetary policy), GPD, 
M1 (indicating the money supply) and short-term interest rate (indicating the 
cost of borrowing and lending). In addition, OLS regression, correlation 
analysis and underlying trend analysis were applied to supplement the 
analysis of the linear relationships between each pair of variables (growth rate 
year-on-year) which included total loans, total deposits, household saving 
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deposit, M1 and M2, and the index of lending interest rate and deposit interest 
rate. 
 
This paper was designed to answer: 
1. How does the shadow banking system affect the monetary policy? 
The results from the SVAR model suggest that the shadow banking 
system would affect the monetary policy by increasing the growth rate of 
money supply (M1) and the growth rate of CPI. It can be concluded that when 
in the condition of easy monetary policy, activities of the shadow banking 
system would enhance the effectiveness of easy monetary policy by promoting 
the growth rate of CPI and M1 (see the results of impulse response and 
variance decomposition from the section of results and discussion) .However, 
if there was an implementation of tight monetary policy, activities of the 
shadow banking system would reduce the effectiveness of tight monetary 
policy by promoting the growth rate of CPI and M1. Furthermore, the results of 
trend analysis suggest that there is a positive relationship between the growth 
rate of total loans and lending interest rate during the period from November 
2005 to February 2008. It seems that activities of the shadow banking system 
would reduce the effectiveness of implementation of a tight monetary policy by 
increasing the lending interest rate to limit the loan scale. Moreover, it also 
indicates that the relationship between deposit interest rate and the growth 
rate of household savings deposits is negative during the period from February 
2006 to October 2007 implying that the implementation of tight monetary policy 
by increasing the deposits interest rate did not achieve the goal of attracting 
deposits. It can be concluded that activities of the shadow banking system 
would affect the monetary policy instrument to some extent owing to its high 
interest rate compared to the benchmark interest rate set by the central bank, 
such as deposit interest rate and lending interest rate. 
 
2. Is it related to economic growth? 
The results of the SVAR model indicate that an increase in the growth rate 
of the shadow banking system would promote the growth rate of GPD. 
However, the results also suggest that the impact is not obvious (see the 
results of impulse response and variance decomposition). On the other hand, 
the increase in the growth rate of GPD would also promote the growth rate of 
shadow banking system slightly.  
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3. What is the relationship between the shadow banking system and 
money supply? 
The results of trend analysis suggest that there are positive relationships 
between the shadow banking system and money supply including M1 and M2. 
Moreover, the results of correlation analysis suggest that the impact of shadow 
banking on M2 is stronger than the impact on M1. However OLS regression 
analysis indicates a contrary result. In general, therefore, it seems that there 
are indeed impacts of shadow banking on the M1and M2 which implies that the 
shadow banking system could affect the amount of cash in circulation and the 
amount of deposits in the banks. 
 
4. What is the relationship between the shadow banking system and 
deposits? 
The results of OLS regression analysis and correlation analysis indicate 
that there are positive relationships between the shadow banking system, total 
deposits and household savings deposits during the whole sample period. 
However, the results of trend analysis suggest that there is a negative 
relationship between the shadow banking system and household savings 
deposits during the period from November 2005 to January 2008. Therefore, it 
seems that the increase in the growth rate of the shadow banking system 
would reduce the growth rate of household savings deposits in the same 
period but the impact on total deposits is positive. 
5.2 Recommendation 
The regulatory authorities should remain objective with respect to the 
shadow banking system. They should make an effort to provide a sound 
regulatory environment and strengthen regulation on the shadow banking 
system. In addition, to amplify its ability of reallocation of resources, it is also 
necessary to take advantage of the impacts of the shadow banking system on 
economic growth and money supply.  
First, owing to high thresholds in the lending operations set by commercial 
banks, financing difficulty of small-medium enterprises now become the main 
obstacle of entrepreneurial economic development in China. Therefore, 
regulatory authorities should take full advantage of entrusted loans, trust loans 
and private lending and guide the development of the shadow banking system 
under a restricted monetary environment, applying these method as a way of 
allocating resources to contribute to the development of China’s small and 
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medium enterprises. Secondly, for such high interest rates of the shadow 
banking system, the regulatory authorities should limit the maximum interest 
rate value of the shadow banking system, such as private lending. Finally, the 
regulatory authorities should strengthen power on the control of the amount of 
entrusted loans and private lending. Overall, as the shadow banking system 
has a significant role in the monetary and financial system, the shadow 
banking system should be regulated into the scope of the commercial banks’ 
supervision system as soon as possible. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Data for the SVAR model 
 
Date loans(hundred million)GR(%) CPI CPI GR(%)GDP %change pa2M1 M1 GR(%) Interest rate
2001-1-31 96553.21 95.67 10.20% 5,605.40 5.85%
2001-2-28 97196.92 0.67% 95.772 0.11% 10.20% 5,374.40 -4.12% 5.85%
2001-3-31 98130.53 0.96% 95.282 -0.51% 12.10% 5,478.50 1.94% 5.85%
2001-4-30 98991.94 0.88% 95.485 0.21% 11.50% 5,506.80 0.52% 5.85%
2001-5-31 99768.21 0.78% 94.836 -0.68% 10.20% 5,446.40 -1.10% 5.85%
2001-6-30 101343.22 1.58% 93.813 -1.08% 10.10% 5,726.20 5.14% 5.85%
2001-7-31 101710.9 0.36% 93.27 -0.58% 8.10% 5,580.80 -2.54% 5.85%
2001-8-31 102148.09 0.43% 93.357 0.09% 8.10% 5,817.00 4.23% 5.85%
2001-9-30 103364.36 1.19% 94.286 1.00% 9.50% 5,903.50 1.49% 5.85%
2001-10-31 103370.42 0.01% 94.638 0.37% 8.80% 5,873.70 -0.50% 5.85%
2001-11-30 104372.76 0.97% 94.427 -0.22% 7.90% 5,898.40 0.42% 5.85%
2001-12-31 106565.31 2.10% 94.425 0.00% 8.70% 6,168.90 4.59% 5.85%
2002-1-31 106959.43 0.37% 94.714 0.31% 10.90% 6,057.60 -1.80% 5.85%
2002-2-28 107486.12 0.49% 95.772 1.12% 10.90% 5,870.30 -3.09% 5.31%
2002-3-31 109926.01 2.27% 94.52 -1.31% 10.90% 5,947.50 1.32% 5.31%
2002-4-30 110627.07 0.64% 94.243 -0.29% 12.10% 6,046.10 1.66% 5.31%
2002-5-31 111703.09 0.97% 93.793 -0.48% 12.90% 6,124.70 1.30% 5.31%
2002-6-30 114155.91 2.20% 93.063 -0.78% 12.40% 6,314.40 3.10% 5.31%
2002-7-31 114626.67 0.41% 92.431 -0.68% 12.80% 6,348.80 0.54% 5.31%
2002-8-31 116055.88 1.25% 92.704 0.30% 12.70% 6,486.90 2.18% 5.31%
2002-9-30 118516.42 2.12% 93.626 0.99% 13.80% 6,680.00 2.98% 5.31%
2002-10-31 119,207.66 0.58% 93.881 0.27% 14.20% 6,710.10 0.45% 5.31%
2002-11-30 120,498.12 1.08% 93.766 -0.12% 14.50% 6,799.30 1.33% 5.31%
2002-12-31 122,889.94 1.98% 94.047 0.30% 14.90% 7,088.20 4.25% 5.31%
2003-1-31 125,582.27 2.19% 95.092 1.11% 17.50% 7,240.60 2.15% 5.31%
2003-2-28 126,489.47 0.72% 95.964 0.92% 17.50% 6,975.60 -3.66% 5.31%
2003-3-31 129,749.86 2.58% 95.37 -0.62% 16.90% 7,143.90 2.41% 5.31%
2003-4-30 131,105.16 1.04% 95.186 -0.19% 14.90% 7,132.10 -0.17% 5.31%
2003-5-31 133,109.97 1.53% 94.449 -0.77% 13.70% 7,277.80 2.04% 5.31%
2003-6-30 137,303.46 3.15% 93.342 -1.17% 16.90% 7,592.30 4.32% 5.31%
2003-7-31 138,130.48 0.60% 92.893 -0.48% 16.50% 7,615.30 0.30% 5.31%
2003-8-31 153,025.17 ##### 93.538 0.69% 17.10% 7,703.30 1.16% 5.31%
2003-9-30 156,059.89 1.98% 94.656 1.20% 16.30% 7,916.40 2.77% 5.31%
2003-10-31 156,676.17 0.39% 95.571 0.97% 17.20% 7,968.80 0.66% 5.31%
2003-11-30 157,701.12 0.65% 96.579 1.05% 17.90% 8,081.50 1.41% 5.31%
2003-12-31 158,996.23 0.82% 97.057 0.49% 18.10% 8,411.90 4.09% 5.31%
2004-1-31 161,730.64 1.72% 98.135 1.11% 16.60% 8,365.70 -0.55% 5.31%
2004-2-29 163,810.61 1.29% 97.979 -0.16% 16.60% 8,345.60 -0.24% 5.31%
2004-3-31 167,442.53 2.22% 98.232 0.26% 19.40% 8,570.10 2.69% 5.31%
2004-4-30 169,434.99 1.19% 98.803 0.58% 19.10% 8,498.10 -0.84% 5.31%
2004-5-31 170,566.13 0.67% 98.605 -0.20% 17.50% 8,617.30 1.40% 5.31%
2004-6-30 169,905.22 -0.39% 98.009 -0.60% 16.20% 8,776.10 1.84% 5.31%
2004-7-31 169,884.39 -0.01% 97.816 -0.20% 15.50% 8,794.30 0.21% 5.31%
2004-8-31 171,040.15 0.68% 98.496 0.70% 15.90% 8,903.00 1.24% 5.31%
2004-9-30 173,473.07 1.42% 99.578 1.10% 16.10% 9,029.40 1.42% 5.31%
2004-10-31 173,728.97 0.15% 99.68 0.10% 15.70% 9,065.90 0.40% 5.58%
2004-11-30 175,224.01 0.86% 99.283 -0.40% 14.80% 9,227.20 1.78% 5.58%
2004-12-31 177,363.49 1.22% 99.386 0.10% 14.40% 9,581.50 3.84% 5.58%
2005-1-31 181,082.96 2.10% 100 0.62% 16.90% 9,696.00 1.20% 5.58%
2005-2-28 182,042.30 0.53% 101.8 1.80% 16.90% 9,269.80 -4.40% 5.58%
2005-3-31 185,461.32 1.88% 100.884 -0.90% 15.10% 9,459.00 2.04% 5.58%
2005-4-30 186,889.10 0.77% 100.581 -0.30% 16.00% 9,443.40 -0.16% 5.58%
2005-5-31 186,274.10 -0.33% 100.38 -0.20% 16.60% 9,567.80 1.32% 5.58%
2005-6-30 186,178.70 -0.05% 99.577 -0.80% 16.80% 9,847.90 2.93% 5.58%
2005-7-31 185,859.75 -0.17% 99.577 0.00% 16.10% 9,755.30 -0.94% 5.58%
2005-8-31 187,756.60 1.02% 99.776 0.20% 16.00% 9,926.50 1.75% 5.58%
2005-9-30 190,941.90 1.70% 100.475 0.70% 16.50% 10,080.50 1.55% 5.58%
2005-10-31 191,168.27 0.12% 100.876 0.40% 16.10% 10,163.90 0.83% 5.58%
2005-11-30 193,416.93 1.18% 100.574 -0.30% 16.60% 10,400.30 2.33% 5.58%
2005-12-31 194,690.39 0.66% 100.976 0.40% 16.50% 10,690.30 2.79% 5.58%
2006-1-31 199,492.05 2.47% 101.9 0.92% 16.20% 10,695.00 0.04% 5.58%
2006-2-28 201,020.25 0.77% 102.716 0.80% 16.20% 10,421.30 -2.56% 5.58%
2006-3-31 206,394.59 2.67% 101.691 -1.00% 17.80% 10,673.70 2.42% 5.58%
2006-4-30 209,555.78 1.53% 101.788 0.10% 16.60% 10,638.90 -0.33% 5.85%
2006-5-31 211,649.97 1.00% 101.785 0.00% 17.90% 10,921.90 2.66% 5.85%
2006-6-30 215,302.59 1.73% 101.071 -0.70% 19.50% 11,234.20 2.86% 5.85%
2006-7-31 216,935.55 0.76% 100.573 -0.49% 16.70% 11,265.30 0.28% 5.85%
2006-8-31 218,836.14 0.88% 101.073 0.50% 15.70% 11,484.60 1.95% 6.12%
2006-9-30 221,035.86 1.01% 101.982 0.90% 16.10% 11,681.40 1.71% 6.12%
2006-10-31 221,205.32 0.08% 102.289 0.30% 14.70% 11,836.00 1.32% 6.12%
2006-11-30 223,141.55 0.88% 102.485 0.19% 14.90% 12,164.50 2.78% 6.12%
2006-12-31 225,285.28 0.96% 103.803 1.29% 14.70% 12,603.50 3.61% 6.12%
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2007-1-31 231,031.18 2.55% 104.142 0.33% 18.50% 12,848.40 1.94% 6.12%
2007-2-28 235,168.74 1.79% 105.49 1.29% 18.50% 12,625.80 -1.73% 6.12%
2007-3-31 239,585.58 1.88% 105.047 -0.42% 17.60% 12,788.10 1.29% 6.39%
2007-4-30 243,805.22 1.76% 104.842 -0.20% 17.40% 12,767.80 -0.16% 6.39%
2007-5-31 246,277.96 1.01% 105.246 0.39% 18.10% 13,027.60 2.03% 6.57%
2007-6-30 250,792.59 1.83% 105.518 0.26% 19.40% 13,584.70 4.28% 6.57%
2007-7-31 253,106.67 0.92% 106.205 0.65% 18.00% 13,623.70 0.29% 6.84%
2007-8-31 256,135.41 1.20% 107.643 1.35% 17.50% 14,099.30 3.49% 7.02%
2007-9-30 258,970.33 1.11% 108.305 0.61% 18.90% 14,259.20 1.13% 7.29%
2007-10-31 260,331.44 0.53% 108.937 0.58% 17.90% 14,464.90 1.44% 7.29%
2007-11-30 261,205.40 0.34% 109.556 0.57% 17.30% 14,801.00 2.32% 7.29%
2007-12-31 261,690.88 0.19% 110.551 0.91% 17.40% 15,256.00 3.07% 7.47%
2008-1-31 269,695.58 3.06% 111.536 0.89% 15.40% 15,487.00 1.51% 7.47%
2008-2-29 272,165.99 0.92% 114.667 2.81% 15.40% 15,017.80 -3.03% 7.47%
2008-3-31 275,000.21 1.04% 113.766 -0.79% 17.80% 15,086.80 0.46% 7.47%
2008-4-30 279,690.16 1.71% 113.753 -0.01% 15.70% 15,169.50 0.55% 7.47%
2008-5-31 282,875.17 1.14% 113.35 -0.35% 16.00% 15,334.50 1.09% 7.47%
2008-6-30 286,199.38 1.18% 113.009 -0.30% 16.00% 15,482.00 0.96% 7.47%
2008-7-31 290,016.98 1.33% 112.896 -0.10% 14.70% 15,499.30 0.11% 7.47%
2008-8-31 292,732.36 0.94% 112.917 0.02% 12.80% 15,689.00 1.22% 7.47%
2008-9-30 296,477.09 1.28% 113.287 0.33% 11.40% 15,574.90 -0.73% 7.20%
2008-10-31 298,295.65 0.61% 113.295 0.01% 8.20% 15,719.40 0.93% 6.66%
2008-11-30 295,749.55 -0.85% 112.185 -0.98% 5.40% 15,782.70 0.40% 5.58%
2008-12-31 303,394.64 2.58% 111.877 -0.27% 5.70% 16,621.70 5.32% 5.31%
2009-1-31 319,921.84 5.45% 112.651 0.69% 3.80% 16,521.50 -0.60% 5.31%
2009-2-28 330,637.71 3.35% 112.832 0.16% 3.80% 16,615.00 0.57% 5.31%
2009-3-31 349,554.82 5.72% 112.4 -0.38% 8.30% 17,654.10 6.25% 5.31%
2009-4-30 355,472.82 1.69% 112.047 -0.31% 7.30% 17,821.40 0.95% 5.31%
2009-5-31 362,141.69 1.88% 111.763 -0.25% 8.90% 18,202.60 2.14% 5.31%
2009-6-30 377,446.12 4.23% 111.088 -0.60% 10.70% 19,313.80 6.10% 5.31%
2009-7-31 381,137.61 0.98% 110.864 -0.20% 10.80% 19,588.90 1.42% 5.31%
2009-8-31 385,241.19 1.08% 111.562 0.63% 12.30% 20,039.50 2.30% 5.31%
2009-9-30 390,407.85 1.34% 112.38 0.73% 13.90% 20,170.80 0.66% 5.31%
2009-10-31 392,937.64 0.65% 112.728 0.31% 16.10% 20,754.60 2.89% 5.31%
2009-11-30 395,885.31 0.75% 112.859 0.12% 19.20% 21,249.30 2.38% 5.31%
2009-12-31 399,684.82 0.96% 114.003 1.01% 18.50% 22,144.50 4.21% 5.31%
2010-1-31 413,679.60 3.50% 114.341 0.30% 20.70% 22,958.90 3.68% 5.31%
2010-2-28 420,678.38 1.69% 115.879 1.35% 20.70% 22,428.70 -2.31% 5.31%
2010-3-31 425,785.27 1.21% 115.098 -0.67% 18.10% 22,939.80 2.28% 5.31%
2010-4-30 433,525.27 1.82% 115.184 0.07% 17.80% 23,391.00 1.97% 5.31%
2010-5-31 440,018.15 1.50% 115.228 0.04% 16.50% 23,649.80 1.11% 5.31%
2010-6-30 446,045.62 1.37% 114.31 -0.80% 13.70% 24,058.00 1.73% 5.31%
2010-7-31 451,372.55 1.19% 114.522 0.19% 13.40% 24,066.40 0.03% 5.31%
2010-8-31 456,818.62 1.21% 115.467 0.83% 13.90% 24,434.10 1.53% 5.31%
2010-9-30 462,822.64 1.31% 116.426 0.83% 13.30% 24,382.20 -0.21% 5.31%
2010-10-31 468,699.94 1.27% 117.689 1.08% 13.10% 25,331.30 3.89% 5.56%
2010-11-30 474,389.23 1.21% 118.614 0.79% 13.30% 25,942.00 2.41% 5.56%
2010-12-31 479,195.55 1.01% 119.247 0.53% 13.50% 26,662.20 2.78% 5.81%
2011-1-31 483,493.87 0.90% 119.944 0.58% 14.10% 26,176.50 -1.82% 5.81%
2011-2-28 488,870.98 1.11% 121.557 1.34% 14.10% 25,920.10 -0.98% 6.06%
2011-3-31 494,740.70 1.20% 121.313 -0.20% 14.80% 26,625.60 2.72% 6.06%
2011-4-30 502,170.76 1.50% 121.289 -0.02% 13.40% 26,676.70 0.19% 6.31%
2011-5-31 507,686.31 1.10% 121.565 0.23% 13.30% 26,929.00 0.95% 6.31%
2011-6-30 514,025.54 1.25% 121.626 0.05% 15.10% 27,466.30 2.00% 6.31%
2011-7-31 518,941.36 0.96% 121.966 0.28% 14.00% 27,054.60 -1.50% 6.56%
2011-8-31 524,425.79 1.06% 122.626 0.54% 13.50% 27,339.40 1.05% 6.56%
2011-9-30 529,118.34 0.89% 123.528 0.74% 13.80% 26,719.30 -2.27% 6.56%
2011-10-31 534,986.76 1.11% 124.161 0.51% 13.20% 27,655.30 3.50% 6.56%
2011-11-30 540,616.20 1.05% 123.596 -0.46% 12.40% 28,141.60 1.76% 6.56%
2011-12-31 547,946.69 1.36% 124.136 0.44% 12.80% 28,984.80 3.00% 6.56%
2012-1-31 555,253.05 1.33% 125.341 0.97% 11.40% 27,001.00 -6.84% 6.56%
2012-2-29 562,360.40 1.28% 125.447 0.08% 11.40% 27,031.20 0.11% 6.56%
2012-3-31 572,474.82 1.80% 125.681 0.19% 11.90% 27,799.80 2.84% 6.56%
2012-4-30 579,292.11 1.19% 125.413 -0.21% 9.30% 27,498.40 -1.08% 6.56%
2012-5-31 587,224.43 1.37% 125.212 -0.16% 9.60% 27,865.60 1.34% 6.56%
2012-6-30 596,422.59 1.57% 124.461 -0.60% 9.50% 28,752.60 3.18% 6.31%
2012-7-31 601,823.80 0.91% 124.585 0.10% 9.20% 28,309.10 -1.54% 6.00%
2012-8-31 608,863.25 1.17% 125.333 0.60% 8.90% 28,573.90 0.94% 6.00%
2012-9-30 615,089.48 1.02% 125.709 0.30% 9.20% 28,678.80 0.37% 6.00%
2012-10-31 620,143.19 0.82% 125.583 -0.10% 9.60% 29,331.00 2.27% 6.00%
2012-11-30 625,363.56 0.84% 125.709 0.10% 10.10% 29,688.30 1.22% 6.00%
2012-12-31 629,909.64 0.73% 126.714 0.80% 10.30% 30,866.40 3.97% 6.00%
2013-1-31 640,766.52 1.72% 127.982 1.00% 9.90% 31,122.90 0.83% 6.00%
2013-2-28 646,966.40 0.97% 129.389 1.10% 9.90% 29,610.30 -4.86% 6.00%
2013-3-31 657,591.82 1.64% 128.225 -0.90% 8.90% 31,089.80 5.00% 6.00%
2013-4-30 665,514.79 1.20% 128.481 0.20% 9.30% 30,764.80 -1.05% 6.00%
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Appendix 2: VAR model 
 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates    
 Date: 09/06/13   Time: 21:52    
 Sample (adjusted): 3 147    
 Included observations: 145 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
       CPI RATE RGDP RM1 RSB 
      
      CPI(-1)  0.250997  0.006631  0.384008 -0.189305  0.026377 
  (0.08387)  (0.01896)  (0.18071)  (0.29676)  (0.17656) 
 [ 2.99280] [ 0.34985] [ 2.12495] [-0.63790] [ 0.14939] 
      
CPI(-2)  0.065818  0.009988 -0.091303 -0.130448 -0.162652 
  (0.08326)  (0.01882)  (0.17940)  (0.29461)  (0.17528) 
 [ 0.79052] [ 0.53076] [-0.50892] [-0.44278] [-0.92793] 
      
RATE(-1)  0.464223  1.322420  1.283180  0.261050 -0.494912 
  (0.36684)  (0.08291)  (0.79045)  (1.29804)  (0.77230) 
 [ 1.26547] [ 15.9499] [ 1.62334] [ 0.20111] [-0.64083] 
      
RATE(-2) -0.359607 -0.356737 -1.769163 -0.880863  0.265398 
  (0.36925)  (0.08346)  (0.79565)  (1.30657)  (0.77737) 
 [-0.97389] [-4.27459] [-2.22356] [-0.67418] [ 0.34140] 
      
RGDP(-1)  0.005197  0.010387  0.923371 -0.181620 -0.055614 
  (0.04145)  (0.00937)  (0.08931)  (0.14666)  (0.08726) 
 [ 0.12537] [ 1.10880] [ 10.3386] [-1.23833] [-0.63732] 
      
RGDP(-2)  6.00E-07 -0.003998 -0.017185  0.162086  0.025697 
  (0.04064)  (0.00919)  (0.08758)  (0.14382)  (0.08557) 
 [ 1.5e-05] [-0.43521] [-0.19623] [ 1.12702] [ 0.30031] 
      
RM1(-1)  0.114751  0.000544  0.078910 -0.208064 -0.018025 
  (0.02662)  (0.00602)  (0.05736)  (0.09420)  (0.05605) 
 [ 4.31048] [ 0.09043] [ 1.37563] [-2.20878] [-0.32160] 
      
RM1(-2)  0.107828  0.000758 -0.067196 -0.168383 -0.021988 
  (0.02651)  (0.00599)  (0.05712)  (0.09380)  (0.05581) 
 [ 4.06754] [ 0.12646] [-1.17637] [-1.79508] [-0.39398] 
      
RSB(-1)  0.050056  0.004479 -0.149340 -0.232568  0.112354 
 44 
 
  (0.04231)  (0.00956)  (0.09117)  (0.14971)  (0.08907) 
 [ 1.18311] [ 0.46837] [-1.63812] [-1.55349] [ 1.26138] 
      
RSB(-2) -0.112381 -0.006806  0.178120  0.154917  0.111795 
  (0.04217)  (0.00953)  (0.09086)  (0.14920)  (0.08877) 
 [-2.66523] [-0.71420] [ 1.96044] [ 1.03831] [ 1.25937] 
      
C -0.007318  0.001103  0.040443  0.057621  0.028859 
  (0.00532)  (0.00120)  (0.01146)  (0.01882)  (0.01120) 
 [-1.37589] [ 0.91782] [ 3.52911] [ 3.06189] [ 2.57741] 
      
       R-squared  0.317183  0.963313  0.890381  0.135881  0.076030 
 Adj. R-squared  0.266227  0.960575  0.882200  0.071395  0.007077 
 Sum sq. resids  0.004358  0.000223  0.020235  0.054567  0.019316 
 S.E. equation  0.005703  0.001289  0.012288  0.020180  0.012006 
 F-statistic  6.224596  351.8496  108.8412  2.107128  1.102641 
 Log likelihood  549.1566  764.7943  437.8420  365.9212  441.2108 
 Akaike AIC -7.422849 -10.39716 -5.887476 -4.895464 -5.933942 
 Schwarz SC -7.197028 -10.17134 -5.661655 -4.669643 -5.708120 
 Mean dependent  0.002086  0.058793  0.140883  0.012188  0.013358 
 S.D. dependent  0.006658  0.006492  0.035804  0.020941  0.012049 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  3.61E-22    
 Determinant resid covariance  2.43E-22    
 Log likelihood  2579.380    
 Akaike information criterion -34.81903    
 Schwarz criterion -33.68993    
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Appendix 3: SVAR model 
 
 Structural VAR Estimates    
 Date: 09/08/13   Time: 23:07    
 Sample (adjusted): 2 147    
 Included observations: 146 after adjustments   
 Estimation method: method of scoring (analytic derivatives)  
 Convergence achieved after 8 iterations   
 Structural VAR is just-identified    
      
      Model: Ae = Bu where E[uu']=I    
Restriction Type: short-run text form   
@e1 = C(1)*@u1     
@e2 = C(2)*@e1 + C(3)*@u2    
@e3 = C(4)*@e1 + C(5)*@e2 + C(6)*@u3   
@e4 = C(7)*@e1 + C(8)*@e2 + C(9)*@e3 + C(10)*@u4   
@e5 = C(11)*@e1 + C(12)*@e2 + C(13)*@e3 + C(14)*@e4 + C(15)*@u5  
where     
@e1 represents CPI residuals    
@e2 represents RATE residuals    
@e3 represents RGDP residuals    
@e4 represents RM1 residuals    
@e5 represents RSB residuals    
      
       Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.    
      
      C(2)  0.021546  0.018464  1.166910  0.2432  
C(4)  0.126732  0.170789  0.742038  0.4581  
C(5)  1.598447  0.761958  2.097814  0.0359  
C(7) -0.869079  0.255651 -3.399470  0.0007  
C(8)  1.271729  1.155449  1.100636  0.2711  
C(9)  0.493912  0.123650  3.994434  0.0001  
C(11)  0.102704  0.163765  0.627147  0.5306  
C(12)  0.515925  0.715444  0.721126  0.4708  
C(13)  0.129330  0.080306  1.610473  0.1073  
C(14)  0.111094  0.051033  2.176894  0.0295  
C(1)  0.006020  0.000352  17.08801  0.0000  
C(3)  0.001343  7.86E-05  17.08801  0.0000  
C(6)  0.012366  0.000724  17.08801  0.0000  
C(10)  0.018475  0.001081  17.08801  0.0000  
C(15)  0.011393  0.000667  17.08801  0.0000  
      
      Log likelihood   2553.487     
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Estimated A matrix:    
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
-0.021546  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
-0.126732 -1.598447  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.869079 -1.271729 -0.493912  1.000000  0.000000  
-0.102704 -0.515925 -0.129330 -0.111094  1.000000  
Estimated B matrix:    
 0.006020  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.001343  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.012366  0.000000  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.018475  0.000000  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.011393  
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Appendix 3: Data for the analysis of OLS regression, trend 
and correlation 
 
 
Date Loan(100M RMB)Loan M1 M2 total deposit(100M)GR Household savings depositsLending rated po it interest rate
2003-8-31 153025.17 23.90% 18.75% 20.89% 197725.62 22.30% 19.19% 5.31% 1.98%
2003-9-30 156059.89 23.50% 18.51% 20.08% 202869.26 22.50% 19.91% 5.31% 1.98%
2003-10-31 156676.17 23.28% 18.76% 20.02% 204076.95 22.60% 19.66% 5.31% 1.98%
2003-11-30 157701.12 22.60% 18.86% 19.81% 206119.57 22.26% 19.30% 5.31% 1.98%
2003-12-31 158996.23 21.10% 18.67% 19.24% 208055.59 21.70% 19.22% 5.31% 1.98%
2004-1-31 161730.64 20.12% 15.54% 18.44% 210248.48 21.25% 20.46% 5.31% 1.98%
2004-2-29 163810.61 20.70% 19.64% 19.72% 214628.54 21.54% 19.20% 5.31% 1.98%
2004-3-31 167442.53 20.10% 19.96% 19.37% 220563.25 21.00% 18.30% 5.31% 1.98%
2004-4-30 169434.99 19.90% 19.15% 19.05% 222360.32 20.44% 17.84% 5.31% 1.98%
2004-5-31 170566.13 18.60% 18.41% 17.71% 225048.71 19.10% 16.87% 5.31% 1.98%
2004-6-30 169905.22 16.30% 15.59% 16.33% 229670.82 18.20% 16.50% 5.31% 1.98%
2004-7-31 169884.39 15.50% 15.48% 15.93% 230192.75 17.70% 15.89% 5.31% 1.98%
2004-8-31 171040.15 14.10% 15.57% 14.14% 232473.01 17.60% 15.35% 5.31% 1.98%
2004-9-30 173473.07 13.60% 14.06% 14.40% 235029.68 15.80% 14.44% 5.31% 1.98%
2004-10-31 173728.97 13.30% 13.77% 14.25% 236483.03 15.90% 14.42% 5.58% 2.25%
2004-11-30 175224.01 13.50% 14.18% 14.47% 239788.54 16.30% 15.05% 5.58% 2.25%
2004-12-31 177363.49 14.50% 13.91% 14.89% 240525.07 16.00% 15.38% 5.58% 2.25%
2005-1-31 181082.96 14.20% 15.90% 13.68% 245368.63 16.70% 11.91% 5.58% 2.25%
2005-2-28 182042.3 13.40% 11.07% 13.58% 248752.1 15.90% 15.52% 5.58% 2.25%
2005-3-31 185461.32 13.00% 10.37% 13.55% 255573.32 15.90% 15.54% 5.58% 2.25%
2005-4-30 186889.1 12.50% 11.12% 13.87% 258882.32 16.40% 15.73% 5.58% 2.25%
2005-5-31 186274.1 12.40% 11.03% 14.23% 262848.38 16.80% 15.96% 5.58% 2.25%
2005-6-30 186178.7 13.30% 12.21% 15.32% 269140.58 17.20% 16.30% 5.58% 2.25%
2005-7-31 185859.75 13.10% 10.93% 15.46% 270736.45 17.60% 16.98% 5.58% 2.25%
2005-8-31 187756.6 13.40% 11.50% 16.49% 275100.41 18.30% 17.48% 5.58% 2.25%
2005-9-30 190941.9 13.80% 11.64% 17.07% 279882.41 19.10% 18.06% 5.58% 2.25%
2005-10-31 191168.27 13.80% 12.11% 17.14% 281465.66 19.00% 17.95% 5.58% 2.25%
2005-11-30 193416.93 14.10% 12.71% 17.33% 285504.74 19.10% 17.76% 5.58% 2.25%
2005-12-31 194690.39 12.98% 11.57% 16.74% 287169.52 18.95% 17.98% 5.58% 2.25%
2006-1-31 199492.05 13.80% 10.30% 23.42% 291436.87 17.00% 21.07% 5.58% 2.25%
2006-2-28 201020.25 14.10% 12.42% 23.00% 297671.93 19.70% 18.27% 5.58% 2.25%
2006-3-31 206394.59 14.70% 12.84% 23.15% 305532.64 19.60% 18.23% 5.58% 2.25%
2006-4-30 209555.78 15.50% 12.66% 23.52% 310105.35 19.80% 18.17% 5.85% 2.25%
2006-5-31 211649.97 16.00% 14.15% 23.66% 314347.8 19.60% 17.57% 5.85% 2.25%
2006-6-30 215302.59 15.24% 14.08% 23.17% 318455.71 18.36% 17.12% 5.85% 2.25%
2006-7-31 216935.55 16.30% 15.48% 23.21% 319860.35 18.20% 16.07% 5.85% 2.25%
2006-8-31 218836.14 16.10% 15.70% 22.85% 323903.07 17.80% 16.19% 6.12% 2.52%
2006-9-30 221035.86 15.23% 15.88% 21.79% 327775.52 17.15% 15.99% 6.12% 2.52%
2006-10-31 221205.32 15.20% 16.45% 22.00% 329298.14 17.00% 15.50% 6.12% 2.52%
2006-11-30 223141.55 14.80% 16.96% 21.90% 334361.41 17.20% 15.32% 6.12% 2.52%
2006-12-31 225285.28 15.07% 17.90% 22.12% 335434.1 16.82% 14.56% 6.12% 2.52%
2007-1-31 231031.18 16.00% 20.14% 15.90% 340137.7 16.80% 11.27% 6.12% 2.52%
2007-2-28 235168.74 17.20% 21.15% 17.84% 345444.4 16.00% 14.95% 6.12% 2.52%
2007-3-31 239585.58 16.25% 19.81% 17.26% 354248.28 15.94% 14.81% 6.39% 2.79%
2007-4-30 243805.22 16.50% 20.01% 17.09% 358746.27 15.70% 13.28% 6.39% 2.79%
2007-5-31 246277.96 16.52% 19.28% 16.74% 360327.12 14.63% 11.38% 6.57% 3.06%
2007-6-30 250792.59 16.48% 20.92% 17.06% 369368.28 15.99% 11.40% 6.57% 3.06%
2007-7-31 253106.67 16.63% 20.94% 18.48% 370953.81 15.97% 11.25% 6.84% 3.33%
2007-8-31 256135.41 17.02% 22.77% 18.09% 377415.95 16.52% 10.16% 7.02% 3.60%
2007-9-30 258970.33 17.13% 22.07% 18.45% 382981.2 16.84% 8.80% 7.29% 3.87%
2007-10-31 260331.44 17.66% 22.21% 18.47% 378483.7 14.94% 5.65% 7.29% 3.87%
2007-11-30 261205.4 17.03% 21.67% 18.45% 385507.14 15.30% 6.18% 7.29% 3.87%
2007-12-31 261690.88 16.10% 21.05% 16.74% 389371.15 16.07% 8.76% 7.47% 4.14%
2008-1-31 269695.58 16.74% 20.54% 18.87% 391551.46 15.12% 7.74% 7.47% 4.14%
2008-2-29 272165.99 15.73% 18.95% 17.39% 404927.55 17.22% 7.69% 7.47% 4.14%
2008-3-31 275000.21 14.78% 17.98% 16.19% 415693.11 17.35% 8.70% 7.47% 4.14%
2008-4-30 279690.16 14.70% 18.81% 16.88% 422275.01 17.69% 10.35% 7.47% 4.14%
2008-5-31 282875.17 14.86% 17.71% 17.99% 431273.96 19.64% 13.53% 7.47% 4.14%
2008-6-30 286199.38 14.12% 13.97% 17.29% 438989.25 18.85% 14.56% 7.47% 4.14%
2008-7-31 290016.98 14.58% 13.77% 16.27% 443671.51 19.60% 16.05% 7.47% 4.14%
2008-8-31 292732.36 14.29% 11.28% 15.92% 450172.32 19.28% 18.31% 7.47% 4.14%
2008-9-30 296477.09 14.48% 9.23% 15.21% 454941.54 18.79% 21.06% 7.20% 4.14%
2008-10-31 298295.65 14.58% 8.67% 14.95% 458331.49 21.10% 26.62% 6.66% 3.60%
2008-11-30 295749.55 16.03% 6.63% 14.73% 462369.22 19.94% 26.91% 5.58% 2.52%
2008-12-31 303394.64 18.76% 8.95% 17.78% 466203.32 19.73% 26.32% 5.31% 2.25%
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2009-1-31 319921.84 21.33% 6.68% 18.74% 481592.11 22.98% 33.72% 5.31% 2.25%
2009-2-28 330637.71 24.17% 10.64% 20.35% 498100.3 23.01% 29.20% 5.31% 2.25%
2009-3-31 349554.82 29.78% 17.02% 25.43% 522618.72 25.73% 29.76% 5.31% 2.25%
2009-4-30 355472.82 29.72% 17.48% 25.89% 532941.05 26.21% 29.65% 5.31% 2.25%
2009-5-31 362141.69 30.60% 18.70% 25.68% 546300.02 26.67% 29.05% 5.31% 2.25%
2009-6-30 377446.12 34.44% 24.75% 28.38% 566288.11 29.02% 28.20% 5.31% 2.25%
2009-7-31 381137.61 33.90% 26.39% 28.39% 570390.73 28.54% 26.59% 5.31% 2.25%
2009-8-31 385241.19 34.11% 27.73% 28.49% 573939.55 27.43% 24.08% 5.31% 2.25%
2009-9-30 390407.85 34.16% 29.51% 29.26% 583987.21 28.35% 24.81% 5.31% 2.25%
2009-10-31 392937.64 34.19% 32.03% 29.46% 586884.01 28.05% 21.77% 5.31% 2.25%
2009-11-30 395885.31 33.79% 34.64% 29.64% 592719.76 28.19% 19.85% 5.31% 2.25%
2009-12-31 399684.82 31.74% 33.23% 28.42% 597741.1 28.21% 19.21% 5.31% 2.25%
2010-1-31 413679.6 29.31% 38.96% 26.10% 612877.26 27.26% 12.58% 5.31% 2.25%
2010-2-28 420678.38 27.23% 34.99% 25.53% 622436.84 24.97% 16.93% 5.31% 2.25%
2010-3-31 425785.27 21.81% 29.94% 22.49% 638090.42 22.11% 15.11% 5.31% 2.25%
2010-4-30 433525.27 21.96% 31.25% 21.48% 649915.56 21.95% 14.42% 5.31% 2.25%
2010-5-31 440018.15 21.50% 29.93% 20.99% 660756.78 21.00% 13.83% 5.31% 2.25%
2010-6-30 446045.62 18.20% 24.56% 18.46% 674098.03 19.00% 15.22% 5.31% 2.25%
2010-7-31 451372.55 18.40% 22.86% 17.61% 675706.88 18.50% 15.08% 5.31% 2.25%
2010-8-31 456818.62 18.60% 21.93% 19.21% 686463.53 19.60% 16.20% 5.31% 2.25%
2010-9-30 462822.64 18.50% 20.88% 18.97% 701024.48 20.00% 17.02% 5.31% 2.25%
2010-10-31 468699.94 19.30% 22.05% 19.29% 702793.71 19.80% 15.44% 5.56% 2.50%
2010-11-30 474389.23 19.80% 22.08% 19.46% 708784.3 19.60% 15.74% 5.56% 2.50%
2010-12-31 479195.55 19.90% 20.40% 18.95% 718237.93 20.20% 16.52% 5.81% 2.75%
2011-1-31 483493.87 18.50% 14.02% 17.31% 712828.05 17.30% 18.01% 5.81% 2.75%
2011-2-28 488870.98 17.70% 15.57% 15.73% 726017.64 17.60% 12.33% 6.06% 3.00%
2011-3-31 494740.7 17.90% 16.07% 16.65% 752838.4 19.00% 15.01% 6.06% 3.00%
2011-4-30 502170.76 17.50% 14.05% 15.36% 756262.39 17.30% 13.53% 6.31% 3.25%
2011-5-31 507686.31 17.10% 13.87% 15.08% 767339 17.10% 13.50% 6.31% 3.25%
2011-6-30 514025.54 16.90% 14.17% 15.86% 786432.56 17.60% 14.19% 6.31% 3.25%
2011-7-31 518941.36 16.60% 12.42% 14.67% 779731.73 16.30% 12.08% 6.56% 3.50%
2011-8-31 524425.79 16.40% 11.89% 13.58% 786797.56 15.50% 11.45% 6.56% 3.50%
2011-9-30 529118.34 15.90% 9.59% 13.06% 794100.44 14.20% 10.86% 6.56% 3.50%
2011-10-31 534986.76 15.80% 9.17% 16.73% 791884.98 13.60% 11.03% 6.56% 3.50%
2011-11-30 540616.2 15.60% 8.48% 16.21% 795113.97 13.10% 11.22% 6.56% 3.50%
2011-12-31 547946.69 15.80% 8.71% 17.32% 809368.33 13.50% 12.86% 6.56% 3.50%
2012-1-31 555253.05 15.00% 3.15% 16.63% 801385.32 12.40% 16.10% 6.56% 3.50%
2012-2-29 562360.4 15.20% 4.29% 17.80% 817398.08 12.60% 15.74% 6.56% 3.50%
2012-3-31 572474.82 15.70% 4.41% 18.13% 846931.7 12.50% 16.14% 6.56% 3.50%
2012-4-30 579292.11 15.40% 3.08% 17.46% 842275.28 11.40% 15.84% 6.56% 3.50%
2012-5-31 587224.43 15.70% 3.48% 17.90% 854499.67 11.40% 16.29% 6.56% 3.50%
2012-6-30 596422.59 16.00% 4.68% 18.46% 883068.72 12.30% 17.23% 6.31% 3.25%
2012-7-31 601823.8 16.00% 4.64% 18.91% 878062.3 12.60% 17.99% 6.00% 3.00%
2012-8-31 608863.25 16.10% 4.52% 18.45% 883106.28 12.20% 18.21% 6.00% 3.00%
2012-9-30 615089.48 16.30% 7.33% 19.85% 899647.06 13.30% 18.05% 6.00% 3.00%
2012-10-31 620143.19 15.90% 6.06% 14.64% 896846.62 13.30% 18.64% 6.00% 3.00%
2012-11-30 625363.56 15.70% 5.50% 14.46% 901585.93 13.40% 18.64% 6.00% 3.00%
2012-12-31 629909.64 15.00% 6.49% 14.39% 917554.77 13.30% 16.71% 6.00% 3.00%
2013-1-31 640766.52 15.40% 15.27% 15.92% 929345.33 16.00% 13.13% 6.00% 3.00%
2013-2-28 646966.4 15.00% 9.54% 15.16% 937065.14 14.60% 17.44% 6.00% 3.00%
2013-3-31 657591.82 14.90% 11.84% 15.67% 979300.53 15.60% 16.53% 6.00% 3.00%
2013-4-30 665514.79 14.90% 11.88% 16.07% 978299.69 16.20% 16.02% 6.00% 3.00%
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Appendix 4: OLS regression of total loans and M2 
 
  
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.802204624
R Square 0.643532259
Adjusted R Square 0.64043254
Standard Error 0.023725102
Observations 117
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.116859526 0.11686 207.61 1.60506E-27
Residual 115 0.064731256 0.000563
Total 116 0.181590781
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.080571446 0.007723563 10.4319 2.5E-18 0.065272553 0.09587 0.06527255 0.09587034
Loan 0.589686078 0.040925775 14.40867 1.6E-27 0.508619995 0.670752 0.50861999 0.67075216
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Appendix 5: OLS regression of total loans and M1 
 
 
  
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.656801513
R Square 0.431388228
Adjusted R Square 0.426443778
Standard Error 0.05531404
Observations 117
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.266944543 0.266945 87.247 8.91989E-16
Residual 115 0.351858952 0.00306
Total 116 0.618803496
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.0008419 0.018007151 -0.04675 0.96279 -0.0365106 0.034827 -0.0365106 0.0348268
Loan 0.891249581 0.095416657 9.340608 8.9E-16 0.702247547 1.080252 0.70224755 1.08025162
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Appendix 6: OLS regression of total loans and total 
deposits 
 
 
  
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R0.835777456
R Square 0.698523956
Adjusted R Square0.695902425
Standard Error0.022390405
Observations 117
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.13358271 0.133582706 266.4565111 1.00926E-31
Residual 115 0.05765298 0.00050133
Total 116 0.19123568
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%Standard ErrorUpper 95.0%
Intercept 0.0703568 0.00728906 9.652382146 1.66731E-16 0.055918574 0.084795 0.055919 0.084795
Loan 0.630469284 0.03862342 16.32349568 1.00926E-31 0.553963716 0.7069749 0.553964 0.706975
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Appendix 7: OLS regression of total loans and household 
savings deposits 
 
 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.513448204
R Square 0.263629059
Adjusted R Square0.256995086
Standard Error0.04369988
Observations 113
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.075889 0.07588922 39.739245 6.05E-09
Residual 111 0.211974 0.00190968
Total 112 0.287864
CoefficientsStandard Errort Stat P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%Standard ErrorUpper 95.0%
Intercept 0.079862073 0.0144 5.54580235 2.005E-07 0.051327 0.108398 0.051327 0.108398
Loan 0.477953613 0.075819 6.30390715 6.047E-09 0.327714 0.628193 0.327714 0.628193
